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Walton Land Fund REITs: Investor Recovery Options

Bakhtiari & Harrison is currently investigating potential issues related to Walton Land Fund REITs. Our focus is on ensuring transparency and protecting the interests of investors who may have been misled about these investments. Recent analysis by Craig McCann and Regina Meng of SLCG Economic Consulting has raised significant concerns about the management and marketing of these funds.

Background on Walton Land Fund REITs

The Walton Land Fund 4, LP (WLF4) is under scrutiny due to concerns about how the funds were managed and represented to investors. Based on a detailed analysis of the fund’s financial statements and private placement memoranda (PPM), there are several points of concern that investors should be aware of.

Marketing and Target Audience

Walton Land Fund REITs were primarily marketed to retail investors through various brokerage firms. These investments were presented as opportunities to invest in undeveloped land, with promises of significant returns. However, the actual use of funds and the fees associated with these investments raise questions about the transparency and fairness of these offerings.

Key Findings from the Walton Land Fund 4, LP Analysis

  1. Allocation of Investor Funds:
    • According to the PPM, only 48% of the capital raised from investors was used to purchase undeveloped land.
    • A substantial portion (41%) of the investors’ capital was allocated to Walton in the form of various fees, including a 20.2% finder’s fee and additional management fees.
  2. Broker Commissions:
    • 11% of the investors’ capital was paid to brokerage firms as commissions. This high commission structure could have incentivized aggressive sales tactics, potentially leading to misrepresentation of the investment’s risks and benefits.
  3. Fee Structure and Management Expenses:
    • The PPM outlined significant fees taken by Walton upfront and ongoing management fees. These fees included a 3% sponsor fee and a 17.2% fee for operating expenses unrelated to the specific investment properties.
  4. Inflated Property Values:
    • The analysis found that properties were often sold to WLF4 at a significant markup from their initial purchase price by Walton affiliates. For example, properties acquired for $46 million were sold to the fund for $64 million, a 46.4% markup.

Specific Case Examples

  • Southern Trails Purchase: The initial PPM indicated that 56.6% of investors’ capital would be used to purchase land. However, this percentage was reduced over time, with Walton increasing its management fees and other charges, resulting in only 46.2% of the capital being used for land purchases by the time of the Harvest Grove South transaction.
  • York Farm Purchase: In the York Farm transaction, only 42.4% of investor capital was used to purchase land, while 46.7% was allocated to Walton for various fees.

Financial Statement Observations

  • Immediate Losses: By the end of 2014, WLF4’s financial statements showed a significant immediate loss for investors. Out of $94,469,210 contributed by investors, the fund’s assets were valued at only $70,835,786, reflecting an immediate $23,633,424 loss.
  • Unrealized Depreciation: The financial statements also indicated substantial unrealized depreciation on investments, further impacting investor returns.

Conclusion

Our investigation aims to shed light on the practices and management of Walton Land Fund REITs. We are committed to protecting investors and ensuring they receive fair treatment. If you or someone you know has invested in Walton Land Fund REITs and has concerns about their investment, please contact us at (310) 499-4732.

Bakhtiari & Harrison is dedicated to providing legal support and seeking justice for affected investors. We encourage you to reach out if you believe you have been impacted by these investment practices.